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1 Introduction
The Mirrlees (1971)-model of optimal income taxation has become one of the workhorses
in public economics. In this model, a social planner chooses a redistributive tax policy
subject to a public sector budget constraint and incentive constraints which take the
behavioral responses of individuals to the proposed tax schedule into account. Other
than incentive compatibility and physical feasibility there are no further constraints.
An optimal income tax in the Mirrleesian model is therefore the theoretical benchmark
for any normative model of redistributive taxation. This paper is a first attempt to
understand the tax policies that arise if we replace the benevolent social planner of
the Mirrleesian model by the forces of political competition; i.e., we study a model of
Downsian competition in which politicians propose tax policies.
We view our paper as a first attempt because it is based on the simplest possible
version of the Mirrleesian model: the economy consists of high-skilled and low-skilled
individuals. High-skilled individuals have a comparatively low cost of productive effort,
so that, when confronted with an income tax schedule, these individuals choose a high
level of effort and therefore end up being richer – in the sense of having more pre- and
after-tax income – than the low-skilled individuals. We assume that the economy has
more low-skilled (cf. poor) than high-skilled (cf. rich) agents.
The main part of our formal analysis is based on the assumption that politicians be-
have in a vote-share-maximizing way. As has been argued by Lizzeri and Persico (2001),
this assumption may be appropriate for political systems based on proportional represen-
tation. However, we will also compare our findings to the equilibria that we obtain under
the assumption that politicians seek to maximize their winning probabilities, which may
be descriptive of majoritarian political systems. Finally, we provide a welfare analysis of
the equilibria in the two regimes.
Our first main result characterizes the outcome of political competition between two iden-
tical vote-share-maximizing politicians: there is a unique equilibrium and both politicians
choose the tax policy which maximizes the well-being of the larger group, i.e., the low-
skilled agents. Hence, the assumption that the majority of the population is low-skilled
implies that the equilibrium outcome under Downsian competition is the tax policy that
would be chosen by a Rawlsian social planner in a normative model of income taxation.
The logic is familiar from the basic textbook model of Bertrand competition. Suppose one
politician proposed a tax policy different from the Rawlsian one, then the other politician
can offer a policy that is more attractive to the larger group of low-skilled agents and
thereby win a majority of votes. Hence, a politician who does not propose the Rawlsian
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tax policy is akin to a firm with a price above the marginal cost in the basic Bertrand
model. Such a firm is vulnerable to undercutting by its competitor.
Secondly, we consider the possibility that there is a quality difference between the
politicians, i.e., everything else being equal, one politician is more appealing to the voters.
It has been argued (see, e.g., Besley, 2005; Galasso and Nannicini, forthcoming) that
differences in popularity, competence assessments or charisma of different politicians are,
in an empirical sense, essential to understanding the outcomes of political competition.1
Introducing such a quality difference in our model leads to a strikingly different set of
equilibrium outcomes. The political equilibrium under the assumption that one politician
has a quality advantage is as follows: there is a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium. In
such an equilibrium, both politicians win the election with positive probability. The most
likely policy proposal of the bad politician is the tax policy that is most attractive to the
rich and least attractive to the poor. The most likely proposal of the good politician is
the one which maximizes the well-being of the rich, subject to the constraint that the
bad politician cannot make a proposal that is more attractive to the poor. Again, there
is an analogy to models of Bertrand competition. If there are two firms who compete
in prices but differ in their marginal cost, then the firm with a cost advantage will set
a limit price, which is the maximal price that makes undercutting unprofitable for the
competitor. Here, the good politician proposes a “limit tax policy” with the property
that the bad politician cannot make a proposal that is more attractive to a majority of
voters.
However, this is not the only force that is effective in equilibrium: given that the
good politician proposes the limit tax policy with a high probability, the bad politician
wants to make sure that he gets at least the votes of the rich. Since he is disadvantaged,
he can do so only if he differentiates himself sufficiently from the good politician, and
therefore he has to propose a tax policy that is much more attractive to the rich than the
proposal made by his competitor. Now, given that the bad politician goes for the rich,
the good politician has an incentive to “chase” him; that is, to propose a tax policy that
is equally appealing to the rich, but leaves more utility to the poor, and thereby to win
the votes of all voters, as opposed to a majority. However, if the good politician engages
in chasing, he becomes vulnerable to undercutting by the bad politician, who may then
deviate to a proposal that attracts the majority of poor voters. Hence, in the mixed-
strategy equilibrium, the good politician’s strategy is a compromise between the limit
1There are two possible interpretations of a quality difference in our model: (i) The good politician
is a more efficient manager of the government, i.e., anything else being equal, he is capable of running
the government at lower cost and therefore has a lower revenue requirement in the government budget
constraint; (ii) the good politician is more appealing to voters in some dimension which has no bearing
on government finances, e.g., he is more charismatic.
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tax policy which avoids undercutting and the possibility of getting a larger vote share
by chasing the bad politician. The bad politician’s strategy is a compromise between
the desire to “run away” from the limit tax policy, so as to get at least the votes of the
rich and the prospect of gaining a majority of votes by undercutting, which is profitable
whenever the good politician engages in chasing.
Our equilibrium characterization gets particularly sharp for the limit case which is
obtained by making the quality difference between the two politicians arbitrarily small:
In the limit, the good politician proposes the Rawlsian tax policy with probability 1,
whereas the bad politician’s most likely proposal is the “Anti-Rawlsian” tax policy, i.e.,
the tax policy that is most attractive to the rich. Hence, with a quality difference ar-
bitrarily close to, but different from, zero, the bad politician “specializes” on proposals
that are more attractive to the high-skilled and the good politician “specializes” on those
that are more attractive to the low-skilled. Consequently, the polarization becomes very
large and the equilibrium looks as if proposals were made by two ideological parties, one
party catering to the rich and the other party catering to the poor.
These results are interesting for a variety of reasons. First, Downsian models of po-
litical competition are known and criticized for their convergence results. In our model of
Downsian competition, an arbitrarily small quality difference between the two politicians
suffices to break this result. Even though political parties are assumed to be opportunis-
tic vote-share maximizers, the equilibrium looks as if we had two ideological parties, one
targeting the votes of the poor, the other one targeting the votes of the rich.
Second, it is unsatisfactory that political economy approaches to income taxation
often invoke functional form assumptions so as to make the problem tractable, whereas
normative approaches seek to avoid such assumptions. This is worrisome, because the
differences in the modeling of feasible policies make it difficult to answer the classical
question of welfare economics when assessing the outcomes of political competition: is
the outcome of political competition Pareto-efficient (in the set of incentive-compatible
and resource-feasible tax policies), i.e., does a version of the first welfare theorem hold?
If so, which Pareto-efficient outcomes can be reached, if we replace the fictitious social
planner of the normative theory by the forces of political competition? Put differently,
does a version of the second welfare theorem hold in models of political competition?
Our analysis provides answers to both of these questions. In the symmetric version of
our model, the answer to the first question is “yes”. Vote-share-maximizing politicians
will not waste utility possibilities because these could be turned into additional votes.
The answer to the second question is more interesting: political competition selects an
outcome that is very different from the one that would be chosen by the utilitarian social
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planner, on which the original treatment of Mirrlees (1971) was based. While a utilitarian
planer trades off the utility of the rich and the utility of the poor, the outcome under
political competition is the Rawlsian tax policy with no concern for the well-being of the
rich.
If there is a quality difference between the two politicians, then there is the possi-
bility of a political failure in the sense of Besley and Coate (1998): the bad politician
wins an election with positive probability. Whenever this happens, then, from an ex
post perspective, there exists a Pareto-improving policy change since the good politician
would be capable of generating the same utility for the rich, and give a strictly higher
utility level to the poor. At the same time, however, we cannot Pareto-rank the efficient
equilibrium allocation in the symmetric model and the inefficient equilibrium allocation
in the asymmetric model: the presence of a bad politician implies that the minority of
rich agents is better off than they would be in the equilibrium of the symmetric model;
that is, they benefit from the presence of a bad politician.
A similar conclusion arises from the comparison of the political equilibrium under the
assumption that politicians engage in vote-share maximization and the equilibrium under
the assumption that politicians maximize their winning probabilities. In the latter case,
political failures are avoided. The good politician wins the election with probability 1.
Since he does not care for his margin of victory, his sole concern is to make sure that
his inferior opponent cannot gain a majority of votes by means of undercutting. As a
consequence, there is no way of Pareto-improving upon the equilibrium policy. Under
vote-share-maximization, by contrast, the good politician also chooses policy proposals
with an eye towards the possibility of gaining the votes of the rich. While this implies
that the bad politician wins occasionally, and hence, a political failure, the rich may
benefit from this, in the sense that their expected utility in the “vote-share equilibrium”
is higher than their expected utility in the “winner-take-all-equilibrium.”
The remainder is organized as follows. The next section contains a discussion of related
literature. Section 3 specifies the basic model, which assumes vote-share-maximizing
politicians. Section 4 introduces a mechanism design approach which renders the equilib-
rium characterization tractable. Section 5 contains the results of the equilibrium analysis
and Section 6 outlines the implications for marginal income tax rates. In Section 7, we
show how the results change if politicians maximize winning probabilities rather than
vote shares and provide a discussion of the welfare implications of political competition
in different political systems. The last section contains concluding remarks.
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2 Related Literature
Our work is related to various strands of the literature.
There is a literature on the political economy of redistributive income taxation. Fol-
lowing the approach to political competition developed by Downs (1957), Roberts (1977)
discusses the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in the model of optimal linear
income taxation due to Sheshinski (1972), which restricts attention to affine income tax
schedules. Meltzer and Richard (1981) use this framework to develop a positive theory
of the size of government. Roemer (1999) and De Donder and Hindriks (2003) study
Downsian competition under the assumption that the income tax function is quadratic.
Our work is distinguished from these articles because we do not impose any a priori
restriction on the set of admissible income tax schedules.2
Second, there is a literature on the political economy of distributive politics. This
literature is based on exchange economies, i.e., production is not endogenous. Distributive
politics therefore takes the form of a “divide the dollar”-game in which a policy proposal
specifies how a cake of a given size should be distributed among voters. Examples of this
approach include Myerson (1993), Lizzeri and Persico (2001), Laslier and Picard (2002),
Carbonell-Nicolau and Ok (2007), and Crutzen and Sahuguet (2009). This literature has
some similarities with our approach. First, the policy domain is of a high dimension,
which implies that pure strategy equilibria do not exist, so that one has to focus on
mixed strategy equilibria. Second this literature makes no functional form assumptions
on admissible policies. The difference to our approach lies in the fact that we have
endogenous production, which implies that distributive policies have repercussions for
the size of the cake that is going to be available for redistribution.
Third, there is a recent literature which attempts to link normative public finance and
political economics. This literature has so far focused on dynamic models of taxation,
and on political economy approaches that differ from the one by Downs (1957).3 Our
paper contributes to this research program by performing the most basic exercise one
2Roemer (2007) studies a model of political competition in a Mirrleesian income tax framework.
However, he is not concerned with political competition a` la Downs, but uses a Party Unanimity Nash
Equilibrium as solution concept, see also Roemer (1999).
3Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2008; 2010) study optimal taxation in a dynamic model subject to
the constraint that a selfish politician is willing to propose this policy. For this purpose, they make use of
the Barro (1973) and Fehrejohn (1986) model, in which voters are able to discipline politicians who would
otherwise run away with the economy’s resources. Battaglini and Coate (2008) study a dynamic model
of Ramsey taxation and public-goods provision in connection with a legislative bargaining procedure a`
la Baron and Fehrejohn (1989). Fahri and Werning (2008) study the taxation of capital income in the
probabilistic voting model by Lindbeck and Weibull (1987). Martimort (2001) studies strategic budget
deficits and optimal taxation in a model with partisan politics.
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could think of: an analysis of Downsian competition in a static Mirrleesian model of
income taxation.
Finally, our paper is related to the studies of political competition under the assump-
tion that the parties are not completely symmetric, but differ in a quality dimension,
named “valence”. Various authors have introduced such differences into formal models of
political competition. Examples include Adams (1999), Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000),
Groseclose (2001), Aragones and Palfrey (2002), and Krasa and Polborn (2009). None
of these papers, however, has embedded this into Mirrleesian model of income taxation.
From a technical perspective, we contribute to this literature in that we show how the
support of equilibrium policies is affected by the size of the quality difference.
3 The Model
Voters. A voter i has utility function Ui = u(ci) − li, where ci is i’s consumption of
a private good and li denotes hours worked by voter i. Voters differ in their productive
abilities. Each voter has a skill parameter wi, where wi ∈ {wL, wH} with 0 < wL < wH .
There is a continuum of voters of mass 1. The population share of voters with a high
skill level (respectively low skill level) is commonly known and denoted by fH (resp.
fL = 1 − fH). We assume that the majority of the population has a low skill level,
0 < fH <
1
2
. We also assume in the following that 1 ≥ fH wHwL .4
Output can be produced according to two constant returns to scale technologies. If
an individual with productivity wt, t ∈ {L;H}, works for one hour, then this yields wt
units of output. We denote the output that is provided by voter i in the following by yi,
where yi = wili. We can hence write a voter’s utility function also as Ui = u(ci) − yiwi .
The function u(.) satisfies u′(.) > 0, u′′(.) < 0, limc→0 u′(c) =∞, and limc→∞ u′(c) = 0.
When individuals choose how much to work they face an income tax schedule T :
R+ → R that relates their pre-tax-income, y, to their after-tax-income, c. Individuals
solve the following utility maximization problem,
U(w | T ) := maxc,y u(c)− yw s.t. c = y − T (y) . (1)
We denote by (c∗(w | T ), y∗(w | T )) the pair which solves this utility maximization
problem.
Politicians. Two candidates compete in an election. Politician j, j ∈ {0, 1}, pro-
poses an income tax schedule T j which has to satisfy the following public sector budget
4This assumptions simplifies the exposition. It implies that non-negativity constraints on consumption
levels can be safely ignored; see Bierbrauer and Boyer (2010) for details.
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constraint,
fHT
j
(
y∗(wH | T j)
)
+ fLT
j
(
y∗(wL | T j)
)
≥ bj . (2)
The parameter bj is a revenue requirement in politician j’s public sector budget con-
straint. We allow these requirements to differ across politicians and adopt the following
normalizations, b0 = 0 and b1 ≥ 0. We interpret bj as a quality measure. A good politi-
cian runs the government at a low cost and therefore needs to extract lower tax payments
from individuals. Under the assumption that b0 6= b1, our analysis gives rise to a model
of political competition between a good and a bad politician.5
We denote by Sj = S(bj) the set of income tax schedules that are feasible for politician
j, i.e., the set of income tax schedules satisfying (2).
Voting behavior. Voters vote sincerely, i.e., a voter with skill level w votes for politi-
cian j if U(w | T j) > U(w | T k). If U(w | T j) = U(w | T k) he votes for politician j
if bj < bk, and votes for each politician with equal probability if bj = bk. Thus, if both
proposals deliver the same utility, a voter votes for the more competent politician. If the
politicians are equally competent, the voter flips a coin.6
Definition of Equilibrium. Politicians maximize their vote shares.7 The set of pure
strategies for politician j is Sj. Our equilibrium analysis allows for mixed-strategy equi-
libria; that is, politicians 0 and 1 simultaneously and independently select an income tax
schedule from the sets S0 and S1, respectively, according to the (possibly degenerate)
probability distributions σ0 and σ1. Voters then see the realized proposals T 0 and T 1
and vote for their preferred proposal. We denote the resulting vote shares by Π0(T 0|T 1)
and Π1(T 1|T 0) = 1− Π0(T 0|T 1).
We focus on Nash equilibria that survive the iterated elimination of dominated strate-
gies. A mixed strategy σj is a best response for politician j, if for every T j ∈ Sj+ with
σj(T j) > 0,
T j ∈ argmaxTˆ j∈Sj+
∑
Sk++
σk(T k)Π(Tˆ j | T k) ,
where Sj+ ⊂ Sj are the pure strategies of politician j that survive the iterated elimination
of dominated strategies, and Sk++ ⊂ Sk+ is the set of tax schedules that are proposed by
5In Subsection 4.2, we argue that a model in which the quality difference is unrelated to economic
outcomes, e.g., because one politician appears to be more charming than his competitor, is mathemati-
cally equivalent to the present formulation where a better politician is associated with lower government
consumption.
6The tie-breaking rule is inconsequential for the equilibrium characterization below.
7In Section 7 we discuss what results we would get if we assumed instead that politicians maximize
their winning probabilities.
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politician k with positive probability. If the analog condition is fulfilled for politician k,
then σj and σk form a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.
4 Political Competition between Mechanism Design-
ers
We use a mechanism design approach to reduce the dimensionality of the policy space: as
a first step, we will characterize the real allocations – consisting of consumption levels and
output choices – that are induced by some proposed income tax schedule. We will then,
as a second step, establish a one-to-one relationship between these allocations and the
payoffs of high-skilled and low-skilled individuals, respectively. As will become clear, this
makes it possible to reformulate a game of political competition over non-linear income
tax schedules as a game in which politicians compete on the basis of promised utility
levels. The latter game has a one-dimensional policy space which makes the analysis
tractable.
4.1 The Pareto-frontier
The Taxation Principle, a well-known result (see, e.g., Guesnerie, 1995), implies that,
instead of assuming that politician j proposes an income tax schedule T j, we may equiva-
lently assume that she specifies an allocation consisting of a consumption-output bundle
for low-skilled individuals, (cjL, y
j
L), and a consumption-output bundle for high-skilled
individuals, (cjH , y
j
H) subject to incentive compatibility constraints and a resource con-
straint. The incentive compatibility constraints are
u(cjH)−
yjH
wH
≥ u(cjL)−
yjL
wH
, (3)
and
u(cjL)−
yjL
wL
≥ u(cjH)−
yjH
wL
. (4)
The resource constraint is
fH(y
j
H − cjH) + fL(yjL − cjL) ≥ bj . (5)
The set of allocations satisfying conditions (3) - (5) is still fairly large. However, we can
simplify the analysis further based on the observation that a vote-share maximizer will
propose an allocation that is Pareto-efficient in the set allocations satisfying (3) - (5).
9
To characterize the set of Pareto-efficient allocations, we study a family of optimization
problems, which depend on two parameters, namely the revenue requirement of politician
j, bj, and a given utility level for the low-skilled voters,
u(cjL)−
yjL
wL
= vjL . (6)
We denote the set of allocations satisfying (3) - (6) byA(vjL, bj). We can now define the set
of Pareto-efficient allocations with respect to the value function VH : (v
j
L, b
j) 7→ VH(vjL, bj)
of the following optimization problem:
VH(v
j
L, b
j) := max u(cjH)− y
j
H
wH
s.t. (cjL, y
j
L, c
j
H , y
j
H) ∈ A(vjL, bj) . (7)
A solution to this problem is a Pareto-efficient allocation if and only if the utility promise
to the low-skilled, vjL, is such that
∂
∂vjL
VH(v
j
L, b
j) < 0 . (8)
The graph of the function VH(·, bj), over the range where (8) holds, is the Pareto-frontier,
i.e., the frontier of the set of possible utility promises by politician j to low-skilled and
high-skilled individuals.
Figure 1 illustrates the properties of the Pareto-frontier graphically.8 The essential one
for the purposes of the equilibrium analysis is the following: for each politician j, there
is a minimal and maximal utility promise to the low-skilled voters; henceforth denoted
by vL(b
j) and vL(b
j), respectively. If politician 0 has a quality advantage, he can promise
more utility to the low-skilled,
vL(0) > vL(b
1) . (9)
Also, the worst promise by a competent politician is more attractive than the worst
promise by a incompetent politician,
vL(0) > vL(b
1) . (10)
A symmetric argument applies to the possible utility promises to high-skilled individuals;
hence,
VH(vL(0), 0) > V
j
H(vL(b
1), b1) and VH(vL(0), 0) > V
j
H(vL(b
1), b1) . (11)
8The incentive compatibility constraints imply that vH > vL for every point on the Pareto-frontier.
The numerical values on the horizontal axis are therefore different from those on the vertical axis. A
complete analytical characterization can be found in Bierbrauer and Boyer (2010).
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vL
vH
VH(., b
1)
VH(., 0)
vL(b
1) vL(b
1)vL(0) vL(0)
Figure 1: The Politicians’ second-best Pareto-Frontiers when 0 = b0 < b1.
4.2 An alternative interpretation of quality differences: Charisma
The Pareto-frontiers in Figure 1 reflect differences in the revenue requirement. The outer
frontier is based on a revenue requirement of b0 = 0, and the inner frontier is based on
a revenue requirement b1 > 0. Hence, the quality difference between the two politicians
takes the form of a cost differential. Politician 1 is more costly to the voters in the sense
that government consumption is higher.
In the following, we briefly describe an alternative interpretation of the model in which
the quality difference between the two politicians is unrelated to economic outcomes.
Suppose, for the sake of the argument, that politician 0 is more charming than politician
1, but that they can both propose all the tax schedules that correspond to the inner
frontier in Figure 1. Now consider a voter of type t ∈ {L,H}, with a promised utility
level of vt. Following the literature, we assume that the voter’s total utility, reflecting
charisma measured by δ > 0 and economic outcomes, equals vt + δ, if the proposal is
made by the charismatic politician and equals vt, otherwise.
Graphically, this means that the total utility promises that can be made by the good
politician are obtained by an outward translation of the inner frontier along a 45-degree-
line. The resulting pair of Pareto-frontiers has the same qualitative properties as the
ones in Figure 1. In particular, it satisfies conditions (9) − (11). Since these are all
that matters for the formal analysis below, our results do not depend on whether or not
quality differences are interpreted as “real” differences in economic outcomes or simply
as voter attitudes with no direct economic meaning.
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4.3 Equilibrium analysis and the Pareto-frontier
Every point on the Pareto-frontier – which describes possible utility levels of low-skilled
and high-skilled individuals – is associated with a Pareto-efficient allocation; i.e., a speci-
fication of consumption and output levels for high- and low-skilled individuals. Moreover,
according to the Taxation Principle, to every Pareto-efficient allocation there exists an
equivalent income tax schedule.
We can therefore use the following indirect approach for a characterization of equilib-
rium tax schedules. Politician j’s set of pure strategies equals
S˜j = S˜(bj) = [vL(b
j), vL(b
j)] .
If j chooses some utility promise to the low-skilled, vjL, from S˜
j, it is understood that the
utility promise to high-skilled individuals is given by vjH = VH(v
j
L, b
j).
A low-skilled voter then votes for politician j if vjL > v
k
L. If v
j
L = v
k
L, he votes for
politician j if bj < bk, and randomizes if bj = bk. The high-skilled voters behave in
an analogous way. We denote the vote shares associated with a pair of utility promises
(v0L, v
1
L) by Π˜
0(v0L|v1L) and Π˜1(v1L|v0L) = 1− Π˜0(v0L|v1L).
A pair of mixed strategies (σ˜0, σ˜1) forms an equilibrium if for every j ∈ {0, 1} and
k 6= j, vjL ∈ S˜j+ with σ˜j(vjL) > 0,
vjL ∈ argmaxvˆjL∈S˜j
∑
S˜k++
σk(vkL)Π˜(vˆ
j
L | vkL) ,
where S˜j+ ⊂ S˜j are the pure strategies of politician j that survive the iterated elimination
of dominated strategies, and S˜k++ ⊂ S˜k+ is the set of utility promises to the low-skilled
that are proposed by politician k with positive probability.
In the following, we will, as a first step, use this formulation of political competition
to obtain a characterization of equilibrium utility promises. As a second step, we will
work out the implications for the tax schedules that are proposed in equilibrium.
We will be interested in a characterization of political equilibria for arbitrary quality
differences. For reasons which become apparent in part B of the Appendix, our elimi-
nation exercise will, for very small quality differences, run into problems with open sets,
i.e., with subsets of possible utility promises to the low-skilled in which no maximal or
minimal element can be found. To be able to deal with these cases also, we will then,
with some abuse of notation, interpret the strategy spaces S˜0 and S˜1 as arbitrarily fine
discretizations of the sets of possible utility promises.
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5 Equilibrium Analysis
No Quality Difference. We start the equilibrium characterization with the symmetric
case in which both politicians are equally appealing to the voters.
Proposition 1 When the politicians are of equal quality, b0 = b1 = 0, the unique equi-
librium is such that both politicians choose the maximal utility promise to the low-skilled
individuals, vjL = vL(0), for all j ∈ {0, 1}, with probability 1.
vL
vH
vL(0) vL(0)
VH(., 0)
Figure 2: Second-best Pareto frontier of equally competent politicians b1 = b0 = 0.
A sketch of the proof of Proposition 1 suffices. If both politicians are equally com-
petent, they have access to the same set of possible utility promises, as is illustrated in
Figure 2. Now, suppose that politician 1 considers to play a best response to some pure
strategy v0L ≤ vL(0) of politician 0. If he proposes some v1L < v0L, his vote share equals
fH <
1
2
; if he proposes v1L = v
0
L, his vote share equals
1
2
; and if he proposes v1L > v
0
L,
which is possible only if v0L < vL(0), his vote share equals fL >
1
2
. Hence, politician 1’s
best response is to offer more utility to the low-skilled individuals than politician 0.
Since our choice of v0L was arbitrary, this reasoning implies (i) that playing v
1
L = vL(0)
is a best response for politician 1, whatever the proposal of politician 0 is, and (ii) that any
other proposal is weakly dominated: if politician 1 chose some v1L < vL(0) with positive
probability, he could increase his expected payoff against some strategies of politician 0,
namely against those that involve proposals v0L ≥ v1L with positive probability.
Thus, if politicians do not differ in terms of quality, they both choose policy so as to
maximize the well-being of the larger group, the low-skilled individuals, at the expense
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of the well-being of the smaller group, the high-skilled individuals.9
The outcome of political competition is different from the outcome that would be
obtained if a utilitarian social planner chose the optimal policy. A utilitarian planner
chooses vL in order to maximize fLvL + fHVH(vL, 0). The solution is the point on the
frontier that has slope fL
fH
. Political competition, by contrast, selects the outcome where
the slope of the frontier is equal to ∞. This is the outcome that would be chosen by a
Rawlsian social planner who cares only for the low-skilled, i.e., a planner who maximizes
vL, subject to the constraint that vL ∈ [vL(0), vL(0)].
Large Quality Differences. We are now moving to the version of our model in which
the two politicians differ in quality, so that b1 > b0 = 0. Our equilibrium characterization
will depend on the size of the quality difference. We first consider the case of a large
quality difference between politician 1 and politician 0, which arises when politician 0
has a set of pure strategies that guarantee him a vote share of 1, whatever the strategy
played by politician 0. Graphically, such a case is illustrated by Figure 3. More formally,
vL
vH
VH(., b
1)
VH(., 0)
vL(b
1)h(vL(b
1))vL(b1)
Figure 3: Second-best Pareto-frontiers in case of a large quality difference.
we say that the quality difference is large if b1 is such that
h := h(v1L(b
1)) ≥ v1L(b1) ,
9Given that, in our simple setup, the larger group also contains the median skill level, we can interpret
this result as a version of the median voter theorem.
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where, for an arbitrary utility promise v1L of politician 1, h(v
1
L) is implicitly defined by
the equation
VH(v
1
L, b
1) = VH(h(v
1
L), 0) . (12)
Hence, given a utility promise to low-skilled individuals by politician 1, v1L, and a quality
difference b1, h(v1L) is the utility promise to the low-skilled by politician 0 which is such
that the high-skilled are indifferent between the two proposals.
In case of a large quality difference, politician 0 can win a vote share of 1 by making
a utility promise to the low-skilled that belongs to [v1L(b
1), h].
A comparison between the case of a large quality difference and the case with no
quality difference at all, reveals the following: the equilibrium policy if there is no quality
difference is extreme in the sense that the utility of the low-skilled is maximized with no
concern for the utility of the high-skilled. Put differently, the equilibrium policy is the
one that would be chosen by a social planner who seeks to maximize a Rawlsian welfare
function. By contrast, if there is a large quality difference, then the equilibrium policy
is moderate in the sense that the utility of the high-skilled is bounded away from their
worst outcome.
This moderation is obtained because the good politician needs to make sure that the
bad politician can neither make a more attractive offer to the low-skilled, nor a more
attractive offer to the high-skilled. To prevent such a “market entry” by the competitor,
the good politician’s proposals have to be sufficiently attractive both to the low-skilled
and to the high-skilled. This rules out extreme proposals. These considerations are
summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 When the quality difference is large, so that h(v1L(b
1)) ≥ v1L(b1), the good
politician wins with probability 1 and the equilibrium policy is bounded away from the
Rawlsian outcome, i.e., v0L < v¯L(0).
Intermediate Quality Differences. With an intermediate quality difference, the
good politician no longer possesses a pure strategy that guarantees him a vote share
of 1. Whatever he proposes, the bad politician can find a proposal that is more attractive
to at least one group of voters. Formally, we define the case of an intermediate quality
difference by the properties v¯1L > h, and h ≥ h, where
h := h−1(v¯1L) .
A situation with an intermediate quality difference is depicted in Figure 4. As a first
step in the equilibrium characterization, the following Lemma narrows down the set of
proposals that survive the iterated elimination of dominated strategies. It shows that, in
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vL
vH
VH(., b
1)
VH(., 0)
v1L v
1
Lhh
Figure 4: Second-best Pareto-frontiers of politicians for an intermediate quality difference.
equilibrium, the set of possible proposals by the good candidate are more moderate than
those of the bad candidate. Intuitively, the good politician uses his competitive advantage
in order to be appealing to both groups of voters. The bad politician, by contrast, makes
extreme offers to increase his chance of getting at least one group of voters. Specifically,
the bad politician either makes the most attractive offer to the low-skilled, or the most
attractive offer to the high-skilled; i.e., he randomizes between the Rawlsian outcome,
with no concern for the high-skilled, and the Anti-Rawlsian outcome, with no concern
for the low-skilled.
Lemma 1 Suppose that there is an intermediate quality difference between politicians.
Then, the support of politician 1’s equilibrium strategy is contained in {v1L, v1L}, and the
support of politician 0’s equilibrium strategy is contained in {h, v1L}.
Proof First round of elimination. Consider Figure 4. As a first step, we observe that
politician 0 will not make offers strictly smaller than h. Any such offer would imply that
he gains the votes of all high-skilled voters. However, he would still gain all high-skilled
voters if he offers h. Moreover, h gains more low-skilled voters. It gains strictly more
low-skilled voters, whenever politician 1 chooses v1L < h with positive probability. A
symmetric argument implies that politician 0 will not make offers strictly larger than v1L.
Second round of elimination. We now take as given that politician 0 makes only offers
from the segment of his frontier that lie between h and v1L.
(i) Politician 1 will not make offers to the low-skilled that belong to the interval [h, h].
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With any such offer his vote share would be equal to 0. (ii) Now consider the interval
]h, v1L[. Given politician 0’s behavior, in this range politician 1 does not get votes from
the high-skilled individuals. By offering v1L he still does not get high-skilled voters, but he
weakly increases the chance of getting the low-skilled voters. This implies that politician
1 will not make offers from the interval ]h, v1L[. (iii) A symmetric argument implies that
he will not make offers from the interval ]v1L, h[.
Third round of elimination. We now take as given that politician 1 makes only offers
in {v1L, v1L}. We show that politician 0 is not making offers in ]h, v1L[. Suppose, on the
contrary, that he would make an offer from this interval, and consider a deviation to v1L.
Conditional on politician 1 playing v1L, this does not affect politician 0’s vote share: he
still gains the votes of the low-skilled individuals and loses the votes of the high-skilled
individuals. Conditional on politician 1 playing v1L, he will now win the votes of all voters,
and he will not lose the high-skilled voters.

The Lemma implies that we can characterize the equilibrium proposals by looking at
the standard normal form game in Table 1. This is a strictly competitive game, so that
only a mixed-strategy equilibrium exists. Using standard arguments, we can solve for the
unique mixed-strategy equilibrium. Proposition 3 summarizes the results.
Proposition 3 When the quality advantage is intermediate there is a unique equilibrium
which is such that politician 1 plays v1L with probability fL and v
1
L with probability fH and
politician 0 plays h with probability fH and v
1
L with probability fL.
Politician 0 \ Politician 1 v1L v1L
h 1 , 0 fH , fL
v1L fL , fH 1 , 0
Table 1: The normal form game in case of intermediate quality differences.
The logic of the mixed-strategy equilibrium is as follows: the good politician tries
to get the votes of the high-skilled without giving the bad politician an opportunity to
attract the low-skilled voters. This leads him to offer v1L to the low-skilled, i.e., the
maximal utility that the bad politician could possibly offer to the low-skilled. Now, given
that the good politician is making this proposal, the bad politician has to make a much
more attractive offer to the high-skilled to get at least their votes. The probability of
getting their votes is maximized with the proposal v1L. However, the story does not end
here: if the bad politician tries to distinguish himself in this manner, the good politician
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has an incentive to make the offer h which is equally attractive to the high-skilled and
still more attractive to the low-skilled than the competitor’s offer. The good politician
would then gain a vote share of 1. Now, given this behavior, the bad politician has the
opportunity to deviate and to make a more attractive offer to the low-skilled, which would
make him win a majority of votes.
The mixed-strategy equilibrium is shaped by these two forces: the good politician
mainly wants to prevent the entry of the bad politician in the market for the low-skilled.
He chooses the entry-deterring policy with probability fL >
1
2
. Note that the probability
that he protects his share of the low-skilled individuals’ votes is exactly equal to the size
of this group fL. On the other hand, he cannot completely resist the temptation to go
occasionally also for the votes of the high-skilled. The intensity of this temptation is
equal to the size of the minority fH . Given that the good politician, most of the time,
protects his share of the low-skilled, the high-skilled politician, most of the time (also,
with probability fL), protects his share of the high-skilled. Occasionally, however, he tries
to take advantage of his competitor’s temptation and to steal the votes of the low-skilled.
Thus, in equilibrium, the bad politician caters more to the high-skilled and the good
politician caters more to the low-skilled.
Such a moderation was already observed under the assumption of a large quality dif-
ference. A difference between the case of a large and an intermediate quality difference
lies in the observation, that, with a large quality difference, the bad politician does not
gain any votes in equilibrium. Hence, moderation is driven by potential competition out-
of-equilibrium. With an intermediate quality difference, by contrast, the bad politician
gains votes in equilibrium.
We will, by induction, provide an equilibrium characterization that covers all subcases
in which the quality difference is smaller than in the situations discussed so far. In part
B of the Appendix, we will spell out the details of the proof. The general lesson is that,
as we decrease the quality difference, for each politician, more proposals survive the it-
erated elimination of dominated strategies. Moreover, whatever the quality difference,
the good politician 0 draws his proposals from a bounded segment of his frontier. The
smallest proposal that is made with positive probability is h and the largest one is v1L.
Politician 1 makes the smallest proposal on his frontier, v1L, and the largest one, v
1
L, with
positive probability. Moreover, the bad politician randomizes in such a way that propos-
als that are more attractive to the high-skilled have more probability mass, whereas the
good politician puts more mass on proposals that are more attractive to the low-skilled.
Hence, the proposition generalizes the observations that were made previously for the
special cases of an intermediate quality difference. In the following, we will illustrate all
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these properties by moving one step further and considering the case of a small quality
difference.
Small quality differences. We define a small quality difference by two properties:
first, it is not intermediate which implies that h ≥ h; second, it satisfies h2 > h2, where
we define,
h2 := h(h) and h
2
:= h−1(h) ,
see Figure 5.
vL
vH
VH(., b
1)
VH(., 0)
v1L v
1
Lh
M1
M0
hh
2
h2
Figure 5: Second-best Pareto-frontiers of politicians for a small quality difference.
Lemma 2 Consider the case of a small quality difference and suppose that h
2 ≤ h, see
Figure 5. The support of politician 1’s equilibrium strategy is contained in {v1L,M1, v1L},
where M1 := S˜1∩]h, h[. The support of politician 0’s equilibrium strategy is contained in
{h,M0, v1L}, where M0 := S˜0 ∩ [h, h2].
Lemma 2 illustrates the following more general observations: first, as we decrease the
quality difference between the two politicians – i.e., so that the Pareto-frontier of politician
1 gets closer to the Pareto-frontier of politician 0 – the more policies survive the iterated
elimination of dominated strategies. Now each politician randomizes effectively between
three actions, whereas in the case of an intermediate quality difference each politician is
randomizing between two actions.10
10The “actions” labeled M0 and M1 each represent a large number of proposals, which are, however,
payoff-equivalent in equilibrium.
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This increase in the support of equilibrium policies stems from the fact that the bad
politician can gain the support of one group of voters even with a moderate proposal.
To see this more formally, suppose that politician 0 would, as in the case of an interme-
diate quality difference, only make proposals h and v1L with positive probability. Then,
from Table 2, politician 1 can make moderate proposals in M1 that are always a best
response, so that he will no longer play v1L and v
1
L. But then, politician 0 would want
to make moderate proposals also, those in M0, to win with a vote share of 1. Hence,
the equilibrium that was obtained with an intermediate quality difference, is no longer
an equilibrium if the quality difference is made smaller. Now, each politician randomizes
between three actions in equilibrium.
Politician 0 \ Politician 1 v1L M1 v1L
h 1 , 0 fH , fL fH , fL
M0 fL , fH 1 , 0 fH , fL
v1L fL , fH fL , fH 1 , 0
Table 2: The normal form game in case of a small quality difference.
Proposition 4 Consider the case of a small quality difference and suppose that h
2 ≤ h.
Then, the unique equilibrium is as follows:
i) Politician 1 plays v1L with probability p
1
0, a proposal in M
1 with probability p11 =
fH
fL
p10
and v1L with probability p
1
2 = (
fH
fL
)2p10, where p
1
0 =
1
1+
fH
fL
+(
fH
fL
)2
.
ii) Politician 0 plays h with probability q00, a proposal in M
0 with probability q01 =
fL
fH
q00
and v1L with probability q
0
2 = (
fL
fH
)2q00, where q
0
0 =
1
1+
fL
fH
+(
fL
fH
)2
.
Proof The proof follows from a characterization of the mixed strategy equilibria of the
normal form game in Table 2. This is a special case of Proposition 5 below. 
The Proposition shows that, with a small quality difference, the bad politician makes
moderate policy proposals with positive probability and no longer randomizes exclusively
between the extreme outcomes v1L and v
1
L. Otherwise, we obtain similar conclusions as
for the case of an intermediate quality difference: the equilibrium strategy of the good
politician 0 has more probability mass on proposals that are more attractive to the
low-skilled, whereas the bad politician’s probability distribution caters more to the high-
skilled. More formally, for two proposals v0L and vˆ
0
L which are made by politician 0 with
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positive probability, v0L > vˆ
0
L implies that v
0
L is played with a larger probability than vˆ
0
L.
By contrast, for politician 1 we have that v1L > vˆ
1
L implies that v
1
L is played with a smaller
probability than vˆ1L.
Smaller quality differences. In part B of the Appendix, we show that there is a
natural order in which the quality difference can be decreased in a sequence of steps, so as
to obtain a complete equilibrium characterization by induction. Every step implies that,
for each of the two politicians, one additional proposal survives the iterated elimination
of dominated strategies. The normal form game in Table 3 illustrates the outcome of
the elimination exercise for an arbitrarily small quality difference. It presents, for each
politician, the N proposals that survive the iterated elimination of dominated strategies.
These proposals are ordered, so that a larger number is associated with a proposal that
is more attractive to the low-skilled. The following proposition, which is proven in the
Appendix, shows that any such proposal is played with positive probability in equilibrium.
Moreover, the bad politician randomizes in such a way that proposals that are more
attractive to the high-skilled have more probability mass, whereas the good politician
puts more mass on proposals that are more attractive to the low-skilled. Hence, the
proposition generalizes the observations that were made previously for the special cases
of intermediate and small quality differences.
Pol 0 \ Pol 1 v1L0 v1L1 v1L2 v1L3 v1L4 v1L5 . . . v1LN−2 v1LN−1 v1LN
v0L0 1, 0 fH , fL fH , fL . . . . . . . . . . . . fH , fL fH , fL fH , fL
v0L1 fL, fH 1, 0 fH , fL . . . . . . . . . . . . fH , fL fH , fL fH , fL
v0L2 fL, fH fL, fH 1, 0 fH , fL . . . . . . . . . fH , fL fH , fL fH , fL
v0L3 fL, fH fL, fH fL, fH 1, 0 fH , fL . . . . . . fH , fL fH , fL fH , fL
v0L4 fL, fH fL, fH fL, fH fL, fH 1, 0 fH , fL . . . fH , fL fH , fL fH , fL
v0L5 fL, fH fL, fH fL, fH fL, fH fL, fH 1, 0
. . . fH , fL fH , fL fH , fL
...
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
...
v0LN−2 fL, fH fL, fH fL, fH . . . . . . . . . fL, fH 1, 0 fH , fL fH , fL
v0LN−1 fL, fH fL, fH fL, fH . . . . . . . . . fL, fH fL, f,H 1, 0 fH , fL
v0LN fL, fH fL, fH fL, fH . . . . . . . . . fL, fH fL, fH fL, fH 1, 0
where v0L0 = h, v
0
LN = v
1
L, v
1
L0 = v
1
L, and v
1
LN = v
1
L.
Table 3: The normal form game in case of very small quality differences.
Proposition 5 Consider the normal form game in Table 3. This game has a unique
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium with the following properties:
i) Politician 1 plays all actions with positive probability. More specifically, he chooses
action v1Lk with probability p
1
k = (
fH
fL
)kp10, where p
1
0 =
1∑N
k=0(
fH
fL
)k
.
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ii) Politician 0 plays all actions with positive probability. More specifically, he chooses
action v0Lk with probability q
0
k = (
fL
fH
)kq00, where q
0
0 =
1∑N
k=0(
fL
fH
)k
.
In the following, we consider the limit case as we let the quality difference between
the two politicians vanish. As a corollary of Proposition 5, we obtain the following
characterization of the political equilibrium that is obtained as the quality difference
between the two politicians gets arbitrarily small.
Corollary 1 Consider the normal form game in Table 3. As the quality difference goes
to zero, the number N of actions goes to infinity and
i) the probability q0N that politician 0 makes the largest proposal v
0
LN = v¯
1
L converges
to 1;
ii) the probability p10 that politician 1 makes the smallest proposal v
1
L0 = v
1
L converges
to 1− fH
fL
. The probability that he makes the largest proposal v1LN = v
1
L converges to
0.
The Corollary states that, as the quality difference vanishes, the probability that
politician 0 chooses the proposal on his frontier that gives maximal utility to the low-
skilled converges to one.11 The most likely proposal by politician 1, by contrast, is the
one that gives maximal utility to the high-skilled. The corresponding limit probability
is smaller than 1. Hence, politician 1 also makes some moderate proposals with positive
probability. By contrast, the probability of proposals close to the one giving maximal
utility to the low-skilled, v1L, is going to zero.
The surprising insight here is that the limit case, which is obtained as the quality dif-
ference vanishes, behaves differently from the case with no quality difference. The latter
gives rise to a unique equilibrium in which both politicians make the proposal that is most
attractive to the larger group, the low-skilled. Our result shows that an arbitrarily small
quality difference suffices to break this asymmetry. With a quality difference arbitrarily
close to, but different from, zero, the bad politician 1 “specializes” on proposals that are
more attractive to the high-skilled, and the good politician 0 “specializes” on those that
are more attractive to the low-skilled. Consequently, the outcome of Downsian compe-
tition between opportunistic parties looks as if proposals were made by two ideological
parties, a party catering to the rich and a party catering to the poor.
11Note that, as the quality difference disappears, we also have that v¯1L converges to v¯
0
L.
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6 Implications for marginal tax rates
The presence of incentive compatibility constraints in the Mirrleesian model of income
taxation implies that taxation is distortionary in the following two senses: (i) The Pareto-
frontier is concave, and (ii) in the region where the Pareto-frontier is strictly concave,
there is a marginal income tax rate that is different from zero. Propositions 6 and 7
below show that these two observations are in fact equivalent.
The shape of the second-best Pareto-frontier. In the Mirrleesian model of income
taxation, utility is no longer perfectly transferable between high-skilled and low-skilled
individuals, which is reflected in the shape of the second-best Pareto-frontier, relative to
a first-best Pareto-frontier which is based on the assumption that skill levels are publicly
observable, so that incentive compatibility constraints can be ignored. As soon as one of
the incentive constraints is binding, the second best-frontier is strictly concave, whereas
the first-best frontier is linear. This is illustrated by Figure 6 and Proposition 6.12
vL
vH First-best
Second-best
vL(b
j) vL(b
j)α(bj) β(bj)
Figure 6: Pareto-Frontiers.
Proposition 6 For given bj, the function VH has the following properties:
I. There exist numbers vL(b
j) and vL(b
j) so that VH1 < 0 if and only if vL ∈ [vL(bj), vL(bj)].
II. There exist numbers α(bj), and β(bj) with vL(b
j) < α(bj) < β(bj) < vL(b
j), so that:
(a) For vL ∈ [vL(bj), α(bj)[, the low-skilled individuals’ incentive constraint (3) is
binding, VH11 < 0, limvL→vL(bj) | VH1 |= 0 and limvL→α(bj) | VH1 |= fL wLfH wH .
12A proof of the Proposition can be found in Bierbrauer and Boyer (2010).
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(b) For vL ∈ [α(bj), β(bj)], no incentive constraint is binding. Moreover, VH11 = 0,
and | VH1 |= fL wLfH wH .
(c) For vL ∈]β(bj), vL(bj)], the high-skilled individuals’ incentive constraint (2) is
binding, VH11 < 0, limvL→β(bj) | VH1 |= fL wLfH wH , and limvL→vL(bj) | VH1 |=∞.
The relation between the Pareto-frontier and marginal income tax rates. To
any point on the Pareto-frontier corresponds the allocation
a(vjL, b
j) = (cL(v
j
L, b
j), yL(v
j
L, b
j), cH(v
j
L, b
j), yH(v
j
L, b
j)) ,
which solves Problem (7). Following the literature, we interpret the difference between
an individual’s marginal rate of transformation between output y and consumption c,
which equals 1 for each individual, and the individual’s marginal rate of substitution,
1
wu′(c) , as the marginal income tax rate that the individual faces.
13 With reference to
the allocation a(vjL, b
j), we therefore define the marginal tax rates for high-skilled and
low-skilled individuals, respectively, as follows:
τH(v
j
L, b
j) := 1− 1
wHu′(cH(v
j
L, b
j))
and τL(v
j
L, b
j) := 1− 1
wLu′(cL(v
j
L, b
j))
.
The following Proposition shows, for every point on the Pareto-frontier, what the associ-
ated marginal income tax rates look like.14
Proposition 7 Both marginal tax rates are non-decreasing functions of vL. We also
have that τH(v
j
L, b
j) ≤ 0 and that τL(vjL, bj) ≥ 0, for all vjL and bj. More specifically,
(a) For vL ∈ [vL(bj), α(bj)[, τH < 0, τH1 > 0, and τL = 0.
(b) For vL ∈ [α(bj), β(bj)], τH = 0, and τL = 0.
(c) For vL ∈]β(bj), vL(bj)], τH = 0, τL > 0, and τL1 > 0.
According to Proposition 7, both the sign and the comparative statics properties of the
marginal income tax rates depend on which incentive constraint is binding. If the low-
skilled are very badly off, their incentive constraint is binding, which implies an upward
distortion of labor supply for the high-skilled, τH < 0, and no distortionary taxation of
low-skilled labour, τL = 0. Moreover, as the low-skilled are made better off, the upward
distortion of high-skilled labor supply becomes smaller and smaller, so that τH1 > 0.
In the range where no incentive constraint binds, there are no distortions at all, i.e.,
13This interpretation is based on the first-order condition of the utility maximization problem that
individuals face when confronted with an income tax schedule T : choose c and y in order to maximize
u(c)− yw subject to the constraint c = y − T (y). The first order condition is T ′(y) = 1− 1wu′(c) .
14See Bierbrauer and Boyer (2010) for a proof.
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both marginal tax rates are equal to 0. Finally, if the low-skilled individuals’ utility
level is very high, and hence the high-skilled individual’s utility level very low, the high-
skilled individuals’ incentive constraint is binding. This yields a downward distortion of
the supply of low-skilled labor, τL > 0, and no distortion of high-skilled labor supply,
τH = 0. Moreover, the downward distortion gets more severe as we make the low-skilled
individuals even better off, τL1 > 0.
Proposition 7 implies that both marginal tax rates are non-decreasing functions of
the well-being of the poor, vL. The larger the concern for the low-skilled, or the larger
the demand for redistribution, the more distortionary taxation will be needed.
Using Proposition 5, we can now comment on what implications our equilibrium
analysis has for marginal tax rates. The bad politician makes proposals that are more
attractive to the rich with larger probability. In combination with Proposition 7 this
implies that proposals which correspond to lower marginal tax rates are made with a
larger probability. By contrast, the good politician proposes higher marginal tax rates
with a higher probability.
The limit case, as the quality difference gets arbitrarily small, has the following impli-
cations for marginal income tax rates: the good politician proposes maximal marginal tax
rates with probability 1. This involves a positive marginal tax rate on low-skilled labor
and a zero marginal tax rate on high-skilled labor. The most likely proposal of the bad
politician involves minimal marginal tax rates, hence a zero marginal-tax on low-skilled
labor and a negative marginal tax rate on high-skilled labor.
7 Political systems and political failures
In this section, we will first explain how the results of our analysis change if politicians
maximize their probability of winning, as opposed to their vote share. As has been argued
by Lizzeri and Persico (2001), the assumption that politicians maximize their vote shares
seems plausible for a political system with proportional representation, so that larger vote
shares translate into additional seats in parliament. By contrast, the assumption that
politicians maximize their winning probabilities fits better in a winner-take-all system,
as, for instance, the presidential elections in the US or in France. Secondly, we compare
the two equilibria from a welfare perspective.
7.1 Equilibrium in a winner-take-all system
We now assume that politicians care only about their probability of winning an election.
Formally, we assume that a politician’s payoff, from an ex post perspective, is equal to 1
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if his vote share is strictly larger than 1
2
, equal to 1
2
if his vote share is equal to 1
2
, and
zero otherwise.
The characterization of equilibria under this assumption is straightforward: if there
is no quality difference between the politicians, then the equilibrium is the same as under
the assumption of vote-share maximization, i.e., both politicians propose the tax policy
that is most attractive to the majority of low-skilled individuals.
If there is a quality difference, then, for the good politician, all proposals v0L larger
than the “limit tax policy” v1L, guarantee a vote share of fL >
1
2
, and hence a payoff
of 1, whatever the proposal of the bad politician. These proposals are therefore payoff-
equivalent for the good politician, whereas all proposals v0L < v
1
L are strictly dominated.
Given that the good politician can make sure to get a majority, any behavior of the bad
politician is a best-response. He is getting a payoff of 0, no matter what he proposes.
Vote shares are therefore undetermined. The good politician may get a vote share of 1
or a vote share of fL in equilibrium. The bad politician gets a vote share of 0, or a vote
share of fH .
What all equilibria in the winner-take-all system have in common is the following: the
good politicians wins, implying that the equilibrium policy lies on the superior Pareto-
frontier. The well-being of the low-skilled in equilibrium is bounded from below by v1L,
the well-being of the high-skilled is bounded from above by VH(v
1
L, 0). Finally, as we
make the quality difference smaller and smaller, v1L converges to v
0
L, i.e., the equilibrium
policy converges to the one that would result if there was no quality difference at all.
7.2 A welfare comparison
A comparison between equilibria under vote-share maximization or proportional rep-
resentation, on the one hand, and under a winner-take-all system in which politicians
maximize the probability of winning, on the other, yields the following observation: vote-
share maximization gives rise to the possibility of political failures in the sense of Besley
and Coate (1998). Such political failures are avoided with politicians who maximize win-
ning probabilities. The reasoning is as follows: a political failure occurs if an economy’s
set of feasible policies contains a policy that Pareto-dominates the one that is chosen in
the political equilibrium. Clearly, such a failure occurs whenever the bad politician wins
an election because this implies that the equilibrium policy lies on an inferior frontier,
i.e., one that involves excessive government consumption b1 > b0. Since a victory of the
bad politician is possible only under the assumption of vote-share maximization, but not
if politicians maximize winning probabilities, we can conclude that, in our model, propor-
tional representation gives rise to political failures that are avoided in a winner-take-all
system.
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At the same time, however, the equilibrium involving a political failure in the sense
of Besley and Coate (1998) may not be Pareto-dominated by the equilibrium that avoids
a political failure. To see this, it is instructive to look at the equilibrium with vote-
share-maximizing politicians under the assumption of an intermediate quality difference.
In this case, the bad politician wins with a probability of f 2H and this event gives rise
to a political failure. With probability 1 − f 2H , the good politician wins. Moreover, if
the good politician wins, he wins with a proposal v0L ≤ v1L and the event v0L < v1L has
positive probability (which equals fHfL in case of an intermediate quality difference). In
a winner-take-all system, by contrast, the good politician wins with probability 1 and
only makes proposals v0L ≥ v1L. Hence, conditional on a victory of the good politician,
the minority of high-skilled individuals is better off under proportional representation,
whereas the majority of low-skilled individuals is better off in a winner-take-all system.
Now, if the probability that the bad politician wins is sufficiently small, i.e., if the minority
is small, so that f 2H is close to 0, then it is clear that the minority prefers proportional
representation, even if the small probability of a political failure is taken into account.
At first glance, these results may seem paradoxical: the equilibrium involving Pareto-
dominated policies is not Pareto-dominated by the equilibrium avoiding Pareto-dominated
policies. The reason is that, under proportional representation, the good politician, who
is most likely to win, chooses policies that are more attractive to the high-skilled than
those that would be chosen in a winner-take-all system. However, this improvement for
the minority of high-skilled individuals is possible only if there is small probability that
an inefficient policy is chosen in equilibrium.
8 Concluding Remarks
This paper has studied Downsian political competition in a simple Mirrleesian model of
income taxation. Allowing for quality differences among the two competing politicians,
we found, as a main result, that the bad politician’s proposals are designed in order to
attract votes of the rich, whereas the good politician tries to get the votes of the poor. The
limit case that is obtained as the quality difference vanishes has the following most likely
outcome: the good politician’s proposal is the one that would be made by a Rawlsian
social planner, with no concern for the well-being of the rich, and the bad politician’s
proposal is the one that would be made by an Anti-Rawlsian planner, with no concern
for the poor.
We also provided a welfare comparison of political equilibria under proportional rep-
resentation and a winner-take-all system. If there is a quality difference, the outcomes
in the two systems differ. The bad politician may win under proportional representation
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which gives rise to a political failure in the sense of Besley and Coate (1998). However,
this does not imply that a winner-take-all system Pareto-dominates a system with pro-
portional representation. The minority of high-skilled agents may well be better off under
proportional representation.
The model was made tractable by the assumption that the economy consists only of
two groups, a large group of low-skilled or poor agents, and a small group of high-skilled
or rich agents. Our approach was based on the Pareto-frontier in the Mirrleesian model
of income taxation, i.e., on a characterization of possible utility promises to high- and
low-skilled individuals, respectively. A similar approach could conceivably be used in
more general models.
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A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2. The first round of elimination is exactly as in the proof Lemma
1, implying that politician 0 will not make offers strictly smaller than h or strictly larger
than v1L.
Second round of elimination. Given this behavior of politician 0, we now show that
politician 1 will not choose an offer belonging to ]v1L, h]. (i) If politician 0 chooses an
offer v0L > h
2, an offer v1
′
L ∈]v1L, h], and the offer v1L = v1L both yield a vote share of fH
for politician 1. (ii) Now suppose that politician 0 chooses an offer v0L ∈ [h, h2]. In this
case, offer v1
′
L , and the offer v
1
L = v
1
L both imply that the low-skilled vote for politician
0; however, v1L = v
1
L is the proposal with a maximal chance to get at least the vote of
the high-skilled. A symmetric argument implies that politician 1 will not choose an offer
belonging to [h, v1L[.
Third round of elimination. For politician 0, any proposal v0L ∈]h, h[ is dominated
by the proposal v0
′
L = h: (i) if politician 1 chooses v
1
L = v
1
L, both proposals yield the
same vote share of fH , (ii) if politician 1 chooses v
1
L = v
1
L, both proposals yield the same
vote share of fL, and (iii) if politician 1 chooses v
1
L ∈]h, h[, proposals v0′L and v0L ensure
that the high-skilled vote for politician 0. However, the proposal v0
′
L = h maximizes the
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probability of also getting the votes of the low-skilled voters. A symmetric argument
implies that, for politician 0, all proposals in ]h2, v1L[ are dominated.

Proof of Proposition 5. Step 1. It proves useful to introduce the following nota-
tion: suppose that politician 0 plays an arbitrary mixed strategy q0 = (q00, . . . , q
0
N), then
politician 1’s payoff from choosing action v1Lk equals
Π1k = fL
k−1∑
j=0
q0j + fH
N∑
j=k+1
q0j .
In particular, this implies that
Π1k−1 − Π1k = −fLq0k−1 + fHq0k . (13)
Likewise, we define
Π0k = fL
k−1∑
j=0
p1j + p
1
k + fH
N∑
j=k+1
p1j ,
implying that
Π0k−1 − Π0k = −fLp1k + fHp1k−1 . (14)
Step 2. We show that politician 0 plays all actions with positive probability.
(a) Suppose first that q0N = 0. Then politician 1 has a unique best response, which is
to play v1LN . However if politician 1 plays this best response with probability 1, then the
unique best response of politician 0 is v0LN , thereby contradicting the assumption that
q0N = 0. Hence, it must be true that q
0
N > 0.
(b) Now suppose that q0N−1 = 0. By equation (13) and (a) we have that Π
1
N−1−Π1N =
fHq
0
N > 0. This implies that action v
1
LN is not a best response for politician 1, hence
p1N = 0. From (14) this implies that Π
0
N−1 − Π0N = fHp1N−1 ≥ 0. Suppose first that
Π0N−1 > Π
0
N . This contradicts that, by (a), q
0
N > 0 which requires that v
0
LN is a best
response of politician 0. Hence, we must have Π0N−1 = Π
0
N . This requires that p
1
N−1 = 0.
Upon repeating this argument, we find that Π0N−2 − Π0N−1 = fHp1N−2 ≥ 0, which
requires that p1N−2 = 0.
If we repeat the argument further we ultimately conclude that p1k = 0, for all k,
thereby contradicting that
∑N
k=0 p
1
k = 1. Hence, it must be true that q
0
N−1 > 0.
(c) Now suppose that q0N−2 = 0. By equation (13) and (b) we have that Π
1
N−2−Π1N−1 =
fHq
0
N−1 > 0. This implies that action v
1
LN−1 is not a best response for politician 1, hence
p1N−1 = 0. From (14) this implies that Π
0
N−2 − Π0N−1 = fHp1N−2 ≥ 0. Suppose first that
Π0N−2 > Π
0
N−1. This contradicts that, by (b), q
0
N−1 > 0 which requires that v
0
LN−1 is a
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best response of politician 0. Hence, we must have Π0N−2 = Π
0
N−1. This requires that
p1N−2 = 0. Upon repeating the argument, we find that p
1
N−3 = 0, p
1
N−4 = 0, etc.
Also, by part (a), v0LN is also a best response of politician 0, implying Π
0
N−1 = Π
0
N ,
or, equivalently, Π0N − Π0N−1 = fLp1N = 0, hence p1N = 0.
Again, we conclude that p1k = 0, for all k, thereby contradicting that
∑N
k=0 p
1
k = 1.
(d) Upon repeating this argument further, we establish that we must have q0k > 0, for
all k.
Step 3. Politician 0 is willing to play all actions only if Π0k−1−Π0k = 0, for all k. Given
equation (14) this requires that
p1k =
fH
fL
p1k−1 . (15)
Equation (15) implies, in particular, that politician 1 must choose all his actions with
positive probability. Politician 1 is willing to do so only if Π1k−1−Π1k = 0, for all k. Given
equation (13) this requires that
q0k =
fL
fH
q0k−1 . (16)
Equations (15) and (16) imply in particular that p1k = (
fH
fL
)kp10, where p
1
0 =
1∑N
k=0(
fH
fL
)k
.
and that q0k = (
fL
fH
)kq00, where q
0
0 =
1∑N
k=0(
fL
fH
)k
.

Proof of Corollary 1. Statement i) follows upon observing that
q0l =
( fL
fH
)l∑N
k=0(
fL
fH
)k
.
Let l ≤ N − 1, the fact that fL > fH implies that q0N−1 is an upper bound for q0l .
A repeated application of L’Hospital’s rule yields, limN→∞ q0N−1 = 0. Consider instead
limN→∞ q0N . Now a repeated application of L’Hospital’s rule yields limN→∞ q
0
N = 1.
To see that ii) is true, note that, since fH < fL,
lim
N→∞
p10 = lim
N→∞
1∑N
k=0(
fH
fL
)k
= 1− fH
fL
.
We therefore have that
lim
N→∞
p1N = lim
N→∞
(
fH
fL
)N
p10 =
(
1− fH
fL
)
lim
N→∞
(
fH
fL
)N
= 0 .

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B Very small quality differences
In the body of the text, we characterized the political equilibrium for the cases of large,
intermediate, and small quality differences. In the following, we will look at even smaller
quality differences. For the formal definition of the degree of smallness, the following
shorthand notation will prove convenient:
h := h(v1L), h
2 := h(h), . . . and h := h−1(v¯1L), h
2
:= h−1(h), . . .
where the dependence of these functions on the quality difference b1 is suppressed. We
can now associate a quality difference of order k ∈ N, by the properties hk−1 ≥ hk−1 and
hk > h
k
.
If, in relation to the cases in the body of the text, we decrease the quality difference
further, we may run into open set problems. To illustrate this, we will, in the following,
study one more case explicitly. Once this case is understood, we explain how the analysis
generalizes to arbitrarily small quality differences.
Henceforth, we interpret the strategy spaces S˜0 and S˜1 as arbitrarily fine discretiza-
tions of the sets of possible utility promises. For instance, S˜0 will be taken to be a
finite ordered set, S˜0 = {s00, . . . , s0z}, with s0k = vL(0) + kz (vL(0) − vL(0)), where z is an
arbitrarily large integer. Moreover, to simplify the exposition, we make the following
assumptions about the strategy sets S˜0 and S˜1: Whenever hk ∈ [vjL, vjL], then hk ∈ S˜j.
Likewise, h
k ∈ [vjL, vjL] implies hk ∈ S˜j. Moreover, we assume that v1L ∈ S˜0. Also, for any
vL, we will denote henceforth by (vL)
j
+ the smallest element in S˜
j that is strictly larger
than vL, and by (vL)
j
− the largest element that is strictly smaller than vL.
In the following, we will decrease the quality successively in a sequence of steps. The
next case to consider, after the case of a small quality difference in the body of the text,
is defined by the following properties: h2 > h
2
and h
2
> h; see Figure 7.
Lemma B.1 Suppose that h2 > h
2
and h
2
> h. Then, the support of politician 1’s
equilibrium strategy is contained in {v1L, (h)1+, (h)1−, v1L}. The support of politician 0’s
equilibrium strategy is contained in {h, h2, h, v1L}.
Proof The first two rounds of elimination are exactly as in the proof Lemma 2, implying
that politician 0 will not make offers strictly smaller than h, or strictly larger than v1L,
and that politician 1 will not make offers in ]v1L, h] ∪ [h, v1L[. Third round of elimination.
For politician 0, any proposal v0L ∈]h, h2[ is dominated by the proposal v0′L = h2: (i)
if politician 1 chooses v1L = v
1
L, both proposals yield the same vote share of fH ; (ii) if
politician 1 chooses v1L = v
1
L, both proposals yield the same vote share of fL; and (iii) if
politician 1 chooses v1L ∈]h, h[, proposals v0′L and v0L ensure that the high-skilled vote for
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Figure 7: Second-best Pareto-frontiers if h2 > h
2
and h
2
> h.
politician 0. However, the proposal v0
′
L = h
2 maximizes the probability of also getting
the votes of the low-skilled voters. A symmetric argument implies that, for politician 0,
all proposals in ]h, v1L[ are dominated.
Fourth round of elimination. For politician 1, any proposal v1L ∈ [h2, (h)1−[ is domi-
nated by the proposal v1
′
L = (h)
1
−: (i) if politician 0 plays v
0
L ≥ h, both proposals yield a
vote share of fH , (ii) if politician 0 plays v
0
L < h
2, both proposals yield a vote share of
fL, (iii) if politician 0 plays v
0
L ∈ [h2, h[, then the proposal v1′L = (h)1− gives a vote share
of fL against any such proposal, whereas v
1
L ∈ [h
2
, (h)1−[ yields 0 against some of those
proposals. A symmetric argument implies that, for politician 1, all proposals in ]h+, h
2]
are dominated.
Fifth round of elimination. For politician 0, any proposal v0L ∈]h2, h[ is dominated
by the proposal v0
′
L = h: (i) if politician 1 plays v
1
L ∈ {v1L, (h)1+}, both proposals yield a
vote share of fL; (ii) if politician 1 plays v
1
L = v
1
L, both yield a vote share of fH , (iii) if
politician 1 plays v1L = (h)
1
−, then a proposal v
0
L ∈]h2, h[ yields a vote share of fH , whereas
the proposal v0
′
L = h yields a vote share of 1. To be more precise, for politician 0, all
proposals in S˜0 ∩ [(h)1−, h] are payoff-equivalent and dominate the proposals in ]h2, (h)1−[.
Since our assumptions ensure that h ∈ S˜0 ∩ [(h)1−, h], we may without loss of generality
assume that, in case of a tie between h and some other proposal very close to it, politician
0 will eliminate the latter, but not the former. 
Proposition B.1 Suppose that h2 > h
2
and h
2
> h. Then, there is unique equilibrium,
which is as follows:
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i) Politician 1 plays v1L with probability p
1
0, (h)
1
+ with probability p
1
1 =
fH
fL
p10, (h)
1
−
with probability p12 = (
fH
fL
)2p10, and v
1
L with probability p
1
3 = (
fH
fL
)3p10, where p
1
0 =
1∑3
k=0(
fH
fL
)k
.
ii) Politician 0 plays h with probability q00, h
2 with probability q01 =
fL
fH
q00, h with prob-
ability q02 = (
fL
fH
)2q00, and v
1
L with probability q
0
3 = (
fL
fH
)3q00, where q
0
0 =
1∑3
k=0(
fL
fH
)k
.
Proof The proof follows from a characterization of the mixed-strategy equilibria of the
normal form game in Table 4, which is a special case of Proposition 5. 
Politician 0 \ Politician 1 v1L h1+ h
1
− v1L
h 1 , 0 fH , fL fH , fL fH , fL
h2 fL , fH 1 , 0 fH , fL fH , fL
h fL , fH fL , fH 1 , 0 fH , fL
v1L fL , fH fL , fH fL , fH 1 , 0
Table 4: The normal form game if h2 > h
2
and h
2
> h.
Going from the case with h
2 ≤ h to the case with h2 > h has implications that are
by now familiar: for each politician, the number of actions that survive the iterated
elimination of dominated strategies increases by 1. Politician 0 is more likely to win and
randomizes in such a way that proposals that are more attractive to the low-skilled are
played with a larger probability. By contrast, the bad politician makes proposals that are
more attractive to the high-skilled with a larger probability. The cases differ, however, in
the outcome of the elimination procedure. Given that h
2
> h, each politician has exactly
four actions that are played with positive probability, whereas under the assumption
h
2 ≤ h one “action” was a collection of payoff-equivalent proposals. Another difference
between the cases is that now we need the assumption of a discrete set of policy proposals
in order to ensure the existence of equilibrium. A reader who is interested in the details
may check that the fourth round of elimination in the proof of Lemma B.1 would not
work with an unrestricted set of policy proposals.
We now go on and decrease the quality difference between the two politicians further.
The next case to consider is defined by h
2 ≥ h2 and h3 > h3, with two subcases, depending
on whether or not h
3 ≤ h2. From there on, we could move to a case characterized by
h
3 ≥ h3 and h4 > h4, etc. Our reason for not presenting formal Lemmas and Propositions
about these cases is that they would be straightforward generalization of the results above.
In particular, each decrease in the quality difference implies, for each of the two politicians,
one additional proposal that survives the iterated elimination of dominated strategies.
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Moreover, whatever the quality difference, the good politician 0 draws his proposals from
a bounded segment of his frontier. The smallest proposal that is made with positive
probability is h and the largest one is v1L. Politician 1 makes the smallest proposal on his
frontier, v1L, and the largest one, v
1
L, with positive probability, etc. More generally, this
establishes that a larger index k in the order of quality differences is associated with (i) a
smaller quality difference, and (ii) a larger number Nk of actions that are played by either
politician in equilibrium. Letting the quality difference vanish is therefore equivalent to
letting k, and hence the number of actions played in equilibrium, go to ∞.
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